Arkansas Civil Rights Act - School Districts\u27 Liability for Peer Abuse: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds School Districts Have No Duty to Protect Students from Each Other.  Rudd v. Pulaski County Special School District, 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000). by Miller, Kimberly
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 23 Issue 4 Article 4 
2001 
Arkansas Civil Rights Act - School Districts' Liability for Peer 
Abuse: Arkansas Supreme Court Holds School Districts Have No 
Duty to Protect Students from Each Other. Rudd v. Pulaski County 
Special School District, 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000). 
Kimberly Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kimberly Miller, Arkansas Civil Rights Act - School Districts' Liability for Peer Abuse: Arkansas Supreme 
Court Holds School Districts Have No Duty to Protect Students from Each Other. Rudd v. Pulaski County 
Special School District, 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000)., 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 977 (2001). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol23/iss4/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
ARKANSAS CIVIL RIGHTS ACT-SCHOOL DISTRICTS' LIABILITY
FOR PEER ABUSE: ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT HOLDS SCHOOL DISTRICTS
HAVE No DUTY TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM EACH OTHER. Rudd v.
Pulaski County Special School Distric4 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 3 10
(2000).
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the 1980s,' parents sent their children offto school bus stops
or dropped them off at schoolyard gates with confidence that their
children would return home safe and sound.2 Over the past twenty
years, however, parents have become increasingly uneasy when they
surrender their children over to school officials. Despite school
districts' attempts to remedy the problem,3 more and more children fill
I. Schoolyard violence began to gain the media's attention in the I 980s, and, by
1989, the nation had begun to realize that such incidents were increasing instead of
diminishing. See Gwen Crownover, School Shootings Prompt Fears of Trend, ARK.
GAZETTE, Mar. 17, 1989, at IA, available in 1989 WL 6924919. The director of the
Center to Prevent Handgun Violence in Washington, D.C., Dennis Smith, who
researched the prevalence of weapons in schools, remarked, "I think it's a trend.... I
see it going across the country. I'm not trying to be an alarmist, but something is going
on out there that's driving more kids to carry guns." Id.
2. See Felicia R. Lee, One School Confronts a Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1989,
at 3B, available in LEXIS, News Library, US News File. After a fatal shooting in the
hallway of a New York high school, a mother expressed her shock: "We send our kids
to school in the morning and think nothing of it.... For a mother to come home and
find her son has been shot inside school is enough to drive you crazy." Id.
3. See Crownover, supra note 1, at IA. In an effort to makes schools safer, school
officials have implemented various policies. See id. After a string of shootings in 1989,
some schools prohibited students from bringing backpacks to class. See id. School
superintendents have even forbidden students to wear coats or jackets in class. See id.
Tampa, Florida schools, hoping to impress upon children the dangerousness of guns,
involved children in a gun safety course, where children witnessed the effects guns had
on various objects. See Lloyd Chatfield, Blasted Melons Show Kids Guns' Power, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 9, 1989, at IB, available in 1989 WL 6612711. Children
reportedly expressed surprise at the effect the guns had on watermelons. See id. A
thirteen-year-old girl explained, "I think it was a graphic demonstration .... My little
brother thought the gun would just put a hole in the watermelon." Id. More recently,
schools have begun passing "zero tolerance" policies. See Shelby Grad, Irvine; Student
Who Fired Gun in Class Expelled, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993, at B2, available in LEXIS,
News Library, US News File. Under these policies, school districts may immediately
expel a student for possession of a weapon on school premises. See id. These policies,
however, have led to a barrage of litigation concerning schools' apparent
overzealousness in expelling children. See Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting
Our Children and the Fourth Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 818 (1992). Perhaps
the most infamous example of a school's over enthusiasm in enforcing zero tolerance
policies occurred in New Jersey. See Jennifer Harper, "Robbers" Suspended from N.J.
School; "Cops" Too, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at I A, available in LEXIS, News
Library, US News File. There, an elementary school principal suspended four
kindergarten boys who were "playing cops and robbers" at school, poising their hands
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their backpacks and lockers with guns and knives instead of school-
books.4 Sadly, as playground violence has increased and become
commonplace, children in the twenty-first century enter kindergarten
never having experienced that comfortable confidence in their own
safety.5 As children more and more frequently release their frustrations
by injuring other schoolchildren, parents search frantically for a way to
regain the sense of safety that they once took for granted.
The law has not provided much guidance thus far. Because the
United States Supreme Court has yet to resolve this issue, decisions
across the country are disparate and the law is unsettled.6 Most courts,
however, have found that school districts do not stand in a special
in the shapes of guns. See id. After one of the boys said to another student, "Boom.
I have a bazooka, and I'm going to shoot you," the other student reported the incident
to a teacher, who solicited the help of the school's superintendent. Id. The
superintendent explained that his three-day suspension was justified: "Given the
climate of our society, we cannot take any of these statements in a light manner." Id.
But a Virginia mother criticized the superintendent's decision, saying, "He doesn't
understand the consequences." Id. Her little boy had been permanently expelled for
drawing a picture of a gun. See id. Schools have also suspended or expelled children
for packing toy guns and other objects, such as butter knives and nail clippers, that
school districts felt came within the scope of their zero tolerance policies. See id.
4. See Crownover, supra note I, at IA. See also Deborah Auster Colson, Note,
Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an Affirmative Duty of Protection on Public Schools Under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., Winter, 1995, at 169; John W. Walters,
Note, The Constitutional Duty of Teachers to Protect Students: Employing the "Sufficient
Custody'" Test, 83 KY. L.J. 229, 229 (1994). During the first semester of the 1988-1989
school year, Little Rock school officials confiscated I I guns from students. See
Crownover, supra note 1. Further, a 1989 study revealed that Little Rock schools
experienced the third highest number of incidents involving school shootings;
Baltimore and New York City were the only cities with more shooting incidents than
Little Rock. See id. Even Miami's rate of 5.48 guns per 10,000 students was lower
than the rate at Little Rock schools; duringthe 1987-88 school year, Little Rock school
officials confiscated an average of 5.7 guns per 10,000 students. See id.
5. See Eileen Ogintz, Wounded Childhood: Many Youngsters Don't Need TV to Show
Them the Face of War, CHI. TRi., May 24, 1989, at IC. available in LEXIS, News
Library, US News File. Teachers in an inner-city Chicago after-school program
reported having seen children "'playing' funerals: building caskets out of blocks,
taking turns being the minister, the crying mourners and the dead person, who
inevitably died young and violently." Id. The author of a 1989 editorial related a
conversation with her seven-year-old daughter, who asked, "Mommy, when they start
shooting at me at school, which way should I run?" Carol Dell Young, Another Lessonfor Life in the '80s, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 1989, at 15C, available in LEXIS, News Library,
US News File.
6. See William W. Watkinson, Jr., Note, Shades of DeShaney: Official Liability
Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983for Sexual Abuse in the Public Schools, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1237,1237(1995).
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custodial relationship with their students such that school districts owe
students a constitutional duty of care.7
In Rudd v. Pulaski County Special School District,' the Arkansas
Supreme Court joined the majority of courts, holding that school
districts owe no constitutional duty to protect students from peer abuse.9
This note recounts the facts that precipitated the Rudd decision. It also
discusses the history and development of the judicial decisions that led
to the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in Rudd and examines the
court's reasoning in Rudd. Finally, this note explains the implications
of the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in Rudd.
11. FACTS
On the morning of October 9, 1996, Willis Ward Johnson ("Wil-
lis"),' o a student at Jacksonville High School ("Jacksonville High"), took
a handgun to school and hid the gun in his locker." Another student
reported to at least one teacher that he had "overheard a conversation
concerning [Willis], a gun, and something that was going to happen
after school."' 2 Despite testimony that school officials performed two
searches, no one ever found a gun. 3 Willis and Earl Jameson Routt
7. See Robert D. Tennyson, Leffall v. Dallas Independent School District: The
Fifth Circuit Finds Few Duties in the Public Schools, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1995).
See also Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); D.R. v.
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) (en
banc); B.M.H. v. School Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560, 565 (E.D. Va. 1993); Hunter v.
Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 714, 720 (M.D. Pa. 1993), Elliott v. New
Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818,823 (S.D. Ohio 1992), Russell v. Fannin County
Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56,
61 (D.P.R. 1990): Adam Michael Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun 'Cause HeipAin 't
Comin': The Needfor Constitutional Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE
L.J. 588, 594-95 (1993); Yama Shansab, Note, And What of the Meek?: Devising a
Constitutionally Recognized Duty to Protect the Disabled at State Residential Schools, 6 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 777, 777 (1998).
8. 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000).
9. See id. at 799-01, 20 S.W.3d at 312-15.
10. Author's note: Although the court refers to Willis Ward Johnson as "W.J.,"
see Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311, this note will refer to him as "Willis," as
his friends and family referred to him. See Mary Hargrove, 'It HurtsSo Very Much': Nine
Months After the Murder of Their Son, a Sherwood Family Struggles with the Loss, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, July 13, 1997, at I A, available in LEXIS, News Library, US News
File.
11. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 312.
12. Id., 20 S.W.3d at 312.
13. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 312. In their answer to the plaintiffs' interrogatories, the
defendants denied having conducted any "random metal detection screens" that day.
Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 19, Ruddv. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 341
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("James"), 4 also a Jacksonville High student, rode to and from school
regularly on the same bus. 5 The week before the incident, James and
Willis engaged in confrontations and were scolded by the bus driver. 6
On the afternoon of October 9, 1996, as Willis and James rode home on
the school bus, Willis took the gun out and shot James several times,
killing him.'7
Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000) (No. 00-128).
14. Author's note: Although the court refers to Earl Jameson Routt as "Earl," see
Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796,20 S.W.3d at 311, his friends and family knew him as "James,"
see Hargrove, supra note 10, at IA, and this note will refer to him as "James." James,
who had a mild learning disability, was supposed to have graduated at the end of the
1995-96 school year, but because he missed too many hours and was unable to
graduate, he dropped out of school. See id. After moving out of his parents' home and
working at various odd jobs, James became homesick and went home, determined to
return to high school and finish earning his diploma. See id. Had he not been shot,
James would have graduated from high school in May 1997. See id.
15. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311. Although he was 20 years old
when he was shot, James rode the bus to and from school because his parents could not
afford to put him on their insurance. See Hargrove, supra note 10, at IA.
16. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311. Appellee Margie Davis, the bus
driver who had admonished the boys for previous misconduct on the bus, frequently
drove the school bus on which both boys regularly rode. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 311.
"Miss Margie," as the students called her, reported that the discord between James and
Willis began the Friday before the shooting, when Willis threw a spitball that almost
hit James. See Hargrove, supra note 10. See also Linda Satter, 'Started with Spitball, 'It
Ends in Murder Plea: Teen Gets 46 Years in School Bus Killing. ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE,
June 25, 1997, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library, US News File. James
reportedly told Ms. Davis that Willis "want[ed] to fight" but that James wouldn't fight
because James was an adult. Hargrove, supra note 10, at IA. But the following
Monday, Willis "taunted James," saying, "Come on, bitch. Hit me. I want you to hit
me, bitch. Hit me." Id. Around the time of this conversation, two of James's friends
pulled up alongside the bus in a red sports car. See id. Ms. Davis reported that, upon
seeing his friends, James "stuck his head out the window and yelled,'Follow me home.
We're going to come back and whip this nigger's ass."' Id. Later, one of the boys in
the red sports car told police that he drove to where Willis deboarded the bus and
"asked Willis if he would leave James alQne because James was just trying to get his
diploma." Id. After shooting James, Willis, who did not know James's last name,
explained to police that he took the gun to school that day because "he was afraid
James and his friends would beat him up and kill him in the woods." ld. Willis told
the officers that he had not intended to shoot James, but meant only to "scar[e] him and
mak[e] him get down on his knees and ask for forgiveness." Id. Billy Brazle, another
student who rode the bus, said Willis had shown him the gun earlier that day and had
revealed to Billy his intention of killing James. See id. At the time, Billy thought the
gun was a toy and that Willis was only kidding. See id.
17. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796-97, 20 S.W.3d at 312. Announcing that he had heard
that James had been "talking s[hit] about" him, Willis shot a bullet into the seat next
to James and warned James that he was not afraid to use the gun. Hargrove, supra note
10, at I A. Upon James's ducking and throwing his hands up to protect himself, Willis
shot James once in the head and then again in the neck. See id. Willis put two more
bullets in James's back as James slid off his seat to the floor. See id. Willis then fired
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The year before the shooting, Willis attended Sylvan Hills Junior
High School ("Sylvan Hills"), and his records from that period reflected
various disciplinary problems.'" Specifically, the records noted that
Willis was a member of a violent gang and that school officials had
disciplined Willis for fighting and roughhousing in class.'9 School
records also noted Willis's "disorderly conduct" and "persistent
disregard for school rules and authority."2 After Willis took a knife to
school and assaulted another student with the knife, Sylvan Hills
Principal Sue Clark expelled Willis.2' Ms. Clark testified that, once a
student leaves a school, "the disciplinary records are closed, terminated,
resolved."22
James's stepfather, Joe Rudd, and other members of James's family
sued the Pulaski County Special School District ("School District") and
several of its employees.23 Rudd and his family sought compensation
under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act24 and under Arkansas negligence
the last of his six shots, barely missing the cheek of a young girl riding the bus. See id.
Having used up all his bullets, Willis turned around and leveled the gun at Margie
Davis, who opened the door to let him off the bus. See id. When the prosecution
charged Willis, who was 14 years old at the time of the shooting, with capital murder,
the prosecutor planned to seek the death penalty. See Linda Satter, Prosecutors Won't
Seek Death at Request of Victim's Family, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Mar. I1, 1997, at 2 B,
available in LEXIS, News Library, US News File. James's mother and stepfather, Carol
and Joe Rudd, however, pled with the prosecutor to seek a lesser punishment. See
Satter, supra note 16, at I A. The prosecution obeyed the Rudds' request and offered
Willis a reduced sentence in return for Willis's pleading guilty to aggravated assault
and first-degree murder. See id. A few minutes before trial was to begin, Willis
accepted this offer, and his sentence was reduced to a 46-year imprisonment, 40 years
for the murder and 6 for aggravated assault. See id. Willis will be eligible for parole
in 32 years from the date of his sentencing, when he will be 47 years old. See
Hargrove, supra note 10, at IA. After the shooting, Willis's father publicly expressed
the Johnson family's sympathy for the Rudd family and explained that, "[once the
shock wore off, Willis told [his family that] he was sorry. He asked [his father] if he
could take it all back." Id.
18. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 31 i.
19. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 311.
20. Id., 20 S.W.3d at 311.
21. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 311. In expelling Willis, Ms. Clark referred to him as a
"substantial risk." Id., 20 S.W.3d at 311. After he entered prison, Willis continued to
engage in disruptive behavior. See Hargrove, supra note 10, at IA. Although he had
originally resided in the juvenile unitjail officials moved Willis out ofthe juvenile unit
"because he could not conform to the rules and regulations of the facility." Id. Willis
destroyed property, fought with other inmates, and used "disrespectful language" to jail
officials, who cited him around twelve times for such offenses and eventually placed
him in "disciplinary segregation." See id.
22. Rudd, 341 Ark. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311.
23. See id. at 795, 20 S.W.3d at 311.
24. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-105(a) (LEXIS Supp. 1999). The statute provides
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law.25 Appellants asserted that the School District knew or should have
known that Willis posed a threat because the district knew or should
have known that Willis had displayed violent tendencies while he
attended Sylvan Hills.26 Rudd argued that a custodial relationship
existed between the School District and its students which imposed
upon the district a duty to protect students from other students."
Although the appellants presented no evidence that Willis repeated this
pattern of behavior during his attendance at Jacksonville High, the
School District was aware of Willis's behavior problems during his
enrollment at Sylvan Hills.2
The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the School District on both the negligence and the civil rights
claim.29 The court found that the Arkansas Civil Rights Act did not
apply to the facts, and statutory immunity barred Rudd's negligence
suit." The Supreme Court of Arkansas, finding no special relationship
between the School District and either Willis or James, affirmed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the School District and its
employees.3'
Ill. BACKGROUND
Faced with the epidemic of playground violence, parents latch onto
the possibility of holding school districts and their employees legally
accountable for student violence. Plaintiffs in these suits seek to
establish liability in two ways. First, parents bring negligence claims
against school districts under state law tort theories.32 Because most
in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of this state or any of its political subdivisions subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Arkansas Constitution
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, a suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
25. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Rudd(No. 00-128).
26. See id. at 4. See also Rudd, 341 Ark. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 314-15.
27. See id. at 797, 20 S.W.3d at 312.
28. See id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 315.
29. See id. at 795-96, 20 S.W.3d at 311.
30. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Rudd (No. 00-128).
31. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 795-96, 20 S.W.3d at 313-15.
32. See Benjamin Lange Meeker, Note, Is B Less than PL? Economic Tort Law
Analysis and our Public Schools: An Opportunity Forgone in Beshears v. Unified School
District No. 305, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1413, 1420 (1998). See also Anderson v.
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courts apply state sovereign immunity to bar such claims,33 parents have
pursued their claims under federal and state civil rights acts.- This
section will discuss the history and development of judicial responses
to those claims.
A. Negligence Claims: Sovereign Immunity and State Level Duty
Analysis
The success or failure of negligence claims depends largely upon
the State's statutory immunity as it applies to school districts and the
state's judicial interpretation of that immunity. When immunity does
not bar negligence claims, the determination whether liability exists
begins with duty analysis. 5 Where courts have held that immunity did
not bar the claim, plaintiffs have occasionally succeeded in establishing
that a school district owed its students a duty of protection. 6
I. State Sovereign Immuniy from Negligence Claims
Because many states grant school districts immunity from most
negligence claims, courts usually hold that state sovereign immunity
bars negligence claims against school districts.37 Immunity statutes,
however, vary widely from state to state. Some states immunize school
Shaughnessy, 519 N.W.2d 229,232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), rev "d inpart, 526 N.W.2d
625 (Minn. 1995); McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362
(Wash. 1953).
33. See Mickelsen v. Sch. Dist. No. 25, 901 P.2d 508, 510 (Idaho 1995) (barring
suit where statute immunized schools from suits involving injury to persons in school's
custody). See also Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 851 (6th Cir. 1999) (dismissing claim
because statute barred all claims for ordinary negligence and plaintiffs failed to prove
gross negligence). Butsee Anderson, 519 N.W.2d at 232 (reversing summary judgment
in favor of school district because school district owed a duty to prevent students from
carrying guns onto buses); McLeod, 255 P.2d at 362 (remanding case to trial court to
determine whether rape of student on school premises was foreseeable).
34. See Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D.P.R. 1990). See also Armijo v.
Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998); Nabozny v. Podlesny,
92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir.
1996), rev'd in part, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000); Russell v. Fannin County Sch.
Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1992), affirmed, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir.
1992).
35. See Mickelsen, 901 P.2d at 510. See also Soper, 195 F.3d at 851; Armyjo, 159
F.3d at 1260; B.M.H. v. School Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560,563-64 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Morris
v. Ortiz, 437 P.2d 652, 654 (Ariz. 1968); McLeod, 255 P.2d at 362.
36. See McLeod, 255 P.2d at 363-65.
37. See Soper, 195 F.3d at 851.
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districts from negligence claims that arise from custodial relationships,38
while other states immunize schools from "ordinary negligence"
claims. 39 And in states where immunity statutes protect school districts
from suit for exercising some ministerial, as opposed to discretionary,
duty, courts have ascribed a motley of definitions to "ministerial" and
"discretionary" duties.' Yet other states, such as Arkansas, provide
school districts with absolute immunity from tort claims.4 Because
immunity statutes differ from state to state, the cases interpreting
sovereign immunity are highly disparate in reasoning and outcome."2
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit applied immunity to bar a negligence suit in Soper v. Hoben13 In
that case, students sexually assaulted and raped Renee Soper, a
developmentally disabled student who attended Huron Valley Public
School." She and her parents sued the school district and several of its
employees, claiming negligence in the school district's failure to protect
Renee from the assaults.45 Statutory law provided the school district and
its employees immunity from "ordinary negligence" claims.46 Renee's
parents argued that the following conduct amounted to gross negligence:
the school district had implemented no policy regarding the protection
of students like Renee; its agents had allowed Renee to walk from the
classroom to the cafeteria unaccompanied by a school official; and its
agents left Renee and her classmates unsupervised in their classroom. 7
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show gross
negligence, and the statute therefore barred the claim.48
38. See Mickelsen, 901 P.2d at 510.
39. See Soper, 195 F.3d at 851.
40. See Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1260. See also B.M.H., 833 F. Supp. at 563-64.
41. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 21-9-301 (LEXIS Supp. 1999). The statute immunizes
school districts against "[tort] liability and from suit for damages except to the extent
that they may be covered by liability insurance." Id. The statute further provides that
"[njo tort action shall lie against any such. political subdivision because of the acts of
its agents and employees." Id.
42. See Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1260. See also B.M.H., 833 F. Supp. at 563-64.
43. 195 F.3d 845, 851 (6th Cir. 1999).
44. See id. at 848-49.
45. See id. at 847-48. Renee, who had Down's Syndrome, frequently expressed her
affection for her fellow classmates and teachers by hugging them. See id. at 848.
Renee's parents consulted with the school district on numerous occasions regarding
Renee's particular vulnerability to sexual assault, requesting thatthe school district take
special care to supervise Renee. See id. at 84849. School officials allegedly met the
Sopers' concerns with reassurance, advising them that officials would "keep an eye on"
Renee. Id.
46. See id. at 85 1.
47. See id.
48. See id. In a strong dissent, Judge Moore argued that reasonable minds could
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Similarly, in Mickelsenv. School District No. 25,9 Andrea Mickelsen
and her parents sued the school district after other students fighting in
the hallway of the school inflicted severe head injuries on Andrea.5 0
Again, statutory immunity provided the school district and its employ-
ees immunity from the claim." Idaho's immunity statute immunized
school districts when the negligence claim arose from custodial
relationships. 52 Because the plaintiffs' claim rested on the school
district's alleged failure properly to supervise students in its custody, the
statute barred this claim. 3
Applying governmental immunity to negligence claims against
school districts, then, the courts have usually summarily disposed of
such cases. Some courts, however, have allowed plaintiffs to proceed
on negligence claims against school districts under a failure to protect
theory.' These courts have held that liability could attach to a school
district for failure to protect students from foreseeable harm."
2. Duty to Protect at State Level
In states that allow plaintiffs to bring tort suits against school
districts, a plaintiff must encounter the difficult question of whether a
school district owes its students an affirmative duty of protection. In
answering this question, courts employ a sort of Palsgraf6 analysis."
differ as to whether the school district's conduct qualified as grossly negligent. See id.
at 855 (Moore, I., dissenting).
49. 901 P.2d 508 (Idaho 1995).
50. See id at 509.
51. See id. at 510.
52. See id. at 509. The statute provides:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and
scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without
reckless, willful and wanton conduct... shall not be liable for any claim
which ... [a]rises out of injury to a person or property by a person under
supervision, custody or care of a governmental entity ....
IDAHO CODE § 6-904A(2) (1990).
53. See Mickelsen, 901 P.2d at 509-10.
54. See Anderson v. Shaughnessy, 519 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
See also McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128,255 P.2d 360, 365 (Wash. 1953).
55. See Anderson, 519 N.W.2d at 232. See also McLeod, 255 P.2d at 362-63.
56. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
57. See Alhambra Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 470, 473 (Ariz. 1990).
In Alhambra, the Supreme Court of Arizona decided that the school district owed a duty
of protection to Brenda Nichols, a student injured while crossing at a dangerous
crosswalk that the school district had created and maintained: "[l]n creating the
marked crosswalk where none previously existed, the District created a relationship
with those who would use the crosswalk and thereby assumed a duty of reasonable care
2001] 985
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Under Palsgraf, no duty can exist unless the defendant could have
reasonably foreseen that the defendant's negligent act might injure the
particular plaintiff.58 In other words, the plaintiff must have been in the
foreseeable zone of risk for the defendant to have owed the plaintiff a
duty.
59
The Supreme Court of Washington, in McLeod v. Grant County
School District," held that a school district could owe a duty of protec-
tion against reasonably foreseeable harm."' There, two male students
raped Lorraine McLeod, a twelve-year-old girl, in an unlocked room
inside the school gymnasium.62 The court remanded the case, directing
the trial court to determine whether the school district could have
reasonably foreseen the rape.63 In doing so, the court discussed
extensively the foreseeability of the particular harm Lorraine suffered."
The court held that a reasonable jury could find that the school district
could have anticipated that students might use the room to engage in
sexual misconduct.65 Further, the court explained, the school district
would have owed Lorraine a duty to protect her from a reasonably
foreseeable rape.'
Other courts have used the same analysis to reach the opposite
result. In Morris v. Ortiz,"' James Morris was injured in a mechanics
class when another student jumped on a car top that James was
holding.68 The Arizona Supreme Court analyzed the existence of a duty
by examining the foreseeability of the harm.69 The court held that Ortiz,
with respect to its operation .... [Tihe District owed Brenda a common law duty of
care." Alhambra, 796 P.2d at 474.
58. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100. The Alhambra court specifically referred to Chief
Judge Cardozo's opinion in Paisgraf. "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed." Alhambra, 796 P.2d at 473 (quoting Piaisgraf 162 N.E. at 100). In
Paisgraf, Cardozo further explained that the risk that gives rise to a duty is "risk to
another or to others within the range of apprehension." Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
59. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
60. 255 P.2d 360 (Wash. 1953).
61. See id. at 363-65.
62. See id. at 361.
63. See id. at 363-65.
64. See id.
65. See id. If the harm was reasonably foreseeable, then the school district had a
duty either to supervise students in the gymnasium or to lock the door to the room
where the boys raped Lorraine. See id. Accordingly, the school district could be liable
for Lorraine's injuries because it failed to take either precaution. See id.
66. See McLeod, 255 P.2d at 363-65.
67. 437 P.2d 652 (Ariz. 1968).
68. See id. at 653.
69. See id. at 654. The court explained:
[T]o constitute actionable negligence the defendant must owe a duty to the
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the defendant teacher, could not have anticipated the danger that another
student would jump on a car top while James held the car top."°
Because the court determined that Ortiz could not have reasonably
foreseen the danger, the supreme court vacated the trial court's
judgment in favor of James.7
Although courts usually apply statutory immunity to bar negligence
suits, a few courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed with negligence
claims against school districts in these circumstances. In those states
where immunity does not bar all negligence suits, a plaintiff has a
chance at recovery.73 Once a plaintiff survives the statutory immunity
step, she can establish liability if she can persuade the court that the
particular harm her child suffered was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant school district's failure to act.74 But in
states such as Arkansas, which absolutely immunize school districts
from negligence claims, parents of injured schoolchildren must resort
to seeking a constitutional remedy."
B. Judicial Treatment of Federal and State Civil Rights Claims:
Absence of Duty
Like negligence claims, federal and state civil rights actions against
school districts for student-inflicted injuries usually fail. 6 Because civil
plaintiff, the breach ofwhich results proximately in plaintiff's injury. So, the
question which must be answered is, "What duty did Ortiz owe as the
supervising instructor, the breach of which resulted in Morris' injuryT' To
hold that Ortiz had to anticipate Gillmor's act and somehow circumvent it
is to say that it is the responsibility of a school teacher to anticipate the
myriad of unexpected acts which occur daily in and about schools and school
premises, the penalty for failure of which would be financial responsibility
in negligence. We do not think that either the teacher or the district should
be subject to such harassment nor is there an invocable legal doctrine or
principle which can lead to such an absurd result.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
70. See id. James argued that Ortiz might have prevented the injury by assigning
someone to supervise the students while they participated in the project. See id. The
court referred to the argument as "but the sheerest speculation" and remarked that
"[sluch gossamer speculation is the stuff from which dreams are made and not the
foundation stone for an action in negligence." Id.
71. See id. at 654, 656.
72. See McLeod, 255 P.2d at 363-65.
73. See Morris, 437 P.2d at 654.
74. See id.
75. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 21-9-301 (LEXIS Supp. 1999).
76. See Tennyson, supra note 7, at 1064. See also Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch.
Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
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rights acts protect citizens from governmental deprivation of their
liberties, not private deprivation, a plaintiff who alleges that her injury
resulted from a state entity's failure to act must prove that the state
entity owed her a duty to act."' The United States Supreme Court has
found such a duty to exist between prison officials and their prisoners"
and between mental health professionals and involuntarily-committed
patients.79 The Court has left open the possibility that a foster care
agency might owe foster children such a duty.8" Although the United
States Supreme Court has not addressed the existence of such a duty in
the context of school districts, lower courts have repeatedly found that
school officials owed students no constitutional duty to protect them
from other students.8'
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a state entity's
duty of care for an individual in Estelle v. Gamble.82 There, the Supreme
Court held that prison officials have a duty to provide prisoners with
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992); B.M.H. v. School Bd., 833 F.
Supp. 560, 565 (E.D. Va. 1993); Hunter v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp.
714, 720 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 823
(S.D. Ohio 1992); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (N.D.
Ga. 1992); Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56,61 (D.P.R. 1990); Greenfield, supra note 7,
at 594-95; Shansab, supra note 7, at 777.
77. See Matthew J. Conigliaro, Recent Development, Walton v. Alexander: The
Fifth Circuit Limits aState 's Fourteenth Amendment Duty to Protect to Instances oflnvoluntary
Restraint, 70 TUL. L. REV. 393, 394 (1995). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989); Russell, 784 F. Supp. at 1580-81;
Robert L. Phillips, Comment, Peer Abuse in Public Schools: Should Schools Be Liable for
Student to Student Injuries Under Section 1983?, 1995 BYU L. REV. 237, 242.
78. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
79. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982).
80. See Watkinson, supra note 6, at 1264-65.
81. See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1373. See also DorothyJ., 7 F.3d at 732; B.M.H., 833 F.
Supp. at 565; Hunter, 829 F. Supp. at 720; Elliott, 799 F. Supp. at 823; Russell, 784 F.
Supp. at 1583; Arroyo, 748 F. Supp. at 61.
82. 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). In Estelle, a bale of cotton fell on W.J. Gamble,
an inmate in the Texas Department of Corrections. See 429 U.S. at 98-99. Over the
next three months, his pain worsened and he complained of high blood pressure. See
id. at 99-101. Prison officials allowed Gamble to see a doctor, who gave him medicine
for the pain and high blood pressure and also granted him "cell-pass, cell-feed," so that
Gamble would be allowed to abstain from working. See id. In response to Gamble's
refusal to work, however, prison officials punished him, twice bringing him before the
disciplinary committee and also placing him in solitary confinement. See id. at 100-0 1.
During his last period of confinement, Gamble apparently suffered a heart attack, but
prison officials repeatedly denied his requests for medical attention. See id. at 101. He
sued the prison, claiming that prison authorities' failure to provide him adequate
medical care amounted to a constitutional deprivation of his right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. See id.
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medical care. 3 The Court based its decision on the prisoner's inability
to provide his own medical care. 4 The Supreme Court extended the
Estelle exception to a substantive due process claim in Youngberg v.
Romeo. 5 The Court in Youngberg held that mental health professionals
owe involuntarily committed patients a duty to protect these patients
from themselves and from other patients.' Although the Supreme Court
found no duty in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,87 the Court did not foreclose the possibility that a duty of care
might arise in the context of foster care agencies. 8 There, the Court
held that the state agency owed no duty to protect a child from his
father's abuse because the agency had not taken the child into its
custody and had neither created nor increased the child's danger of
suffering abuse at his father's hands.8 9
Applying Estelle, Youngberg, and DeShaney, lower courts have
reasoned that a state entity's duty to protect a private citizen may arise
in one of two ways. First, a state entity may create a special relationship
with an individual by asserting involuntary custody over the victim."
83. See id. at 103-04.
84. See id. The Court explained its reasoning:
An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such
a failure may actually produce physical "torture or a lingering death," the
evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment. In less
serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which
no one suggests would serve any penological purpose .... [It is but just
that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of
the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
85. 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982). In Youngberg, Nicholas Romeo's mother sought
compensation for injuries her son sustained while a patient at Pennhurst State School
and Hospital. See id. at 310. Ms. Romeo had petitioned to have Nicholas committed
after her husband died, because she could not care for Nicholas, who had the cognitive
ability of an 18-month-old child, without her husband's help. See id. at 309-10. In her
complaint, Ms. Romeo alleged that the hospital owed Nicholas a duty to treat and care
for him. See id. at 310.
86. See id. at 318-19, 322.
87. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In DeShaney, Joshua DeShaney's father beat Joshua so
brutally that Joshua suffered permanent brain damage. See id. at 193. Randy
DeShaney's prolonged abuse of his child eventually caused Joshua to fall into a coma.
See id. Joshua suffered multiple brain hemorrhages and will be profoundly retarded for
the remainder of his life. See id. Joshua's mother sued the child protection agency
because the agency knew that Joshua's father abused him, and it did not remove Joshua
from his father's custody. See id.
88. See id. at201.
89. See id. at 198-203.
90. See Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 435,436-37 (1994). See also Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320,
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Second, a duty may arise if the state entity's agents create or increase an
individual's risk for harm.9
I. Involuntary Custody
Plaintiffs, attempting to establish liability against state entities
under the holdings in Estelle, Youngberg, and DeShaney, have succeeded
where the state agency was a prison, a mental healthcare facility, or a
foster home.92 In school district cases, plaintiffs have argued that state
compulsory attendance laws create a special custodial relationship
between school districts and students.93 Because such laws require that
children submit to the school district's custody, these plaintiffs argue,
323-24 (8th Cir. 1993); Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289,293
(8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893
(10th Cir. 1992); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d '846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990); Meador v.
Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474,476 (6th Cir. 1990); Griffith v. Johnston,
899 F.2d 1427, 1439(5thCir. 1990); Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc.,
921 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1990); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320,334-35 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (reversed in part on other grounds); Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F. Supp. 258,
259-60 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
91. See Blum, supra note 90, at 436-37. See also Arinijo v. Wagon Mound Pub.
Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998); Searnons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236
(10th Cir. 1996); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995); Reed v. Gardner,
986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94,99 (2d
Cir. 1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1373-74 (3d Cir. 1992); Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544,550-51 (7th
Cir. 1991); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1392 (10th Cir. 1990); K.H., 914
F.2d at 859 (Coffey, J., concurring and dissenting); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52,
55 (8th Cir. 1990); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1521-22 n.19 (7th Cir.
1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 359 (11 th Cir. 1989);
Hunter v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 714, 720-21 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Was
v. Young, 796 F. Supp. 1041, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Sinthasomphone v. City of
Milwaukee, 785 F. Supp. 1343, 1348-49,(E.D. Wis. 1992); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F.
Supp. 254,265 (D.N.J. 1990); Swader v. Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434,439-40 (E.D. Va.
1990).
92. See Blum, supra note 90, at 439. See also Ashley Smith, Comment, Students
Hurting Students: Who Will Pay?, 34 Hous. L. REV. 579, 607 n.24 (1997); Watkinson,
supra note 6, at 1237.
93. See DR., 972 F.2d at 1371. By 1918, every state had enacted compulsory
school attendance laws. See Greenfield, supra note 7, at 588 n.1. After the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), some states repealed
those laws in an attempt to avoid racial integration. See Greenfield, supra note 7, at 588
n. I. Every state has since re-enacted its compulsory attendance laws. See id. In
Arkansas, compulsory attendance law is codified in Arkansas Code Annotated § 6-18-
222 (LEXIS Supp. 1999). That statute authorizes Arkansas courts to fine parents up
to $500 for their children's repeated absences. See ARK. CODEANN. § 6-18-222(a)(5XA)
(LEXIS Supp. 1999).
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the state asserts involuntary custody over school children.' Courts have
rejected this argument, distinguishing school district cases on the ground
that a school district does not assert total, involuntary custody over
school children." These courts explain that the custody is not total
because school children are in the school district's custody only part of
the day." According to these courts, the custody is not involuntary
because school children may either transfer to private schools or receive
home schooling from their parents or guardians.97
School children are different from prisoners, mental patients, and
foster children, courts explain, because children's parents retain primary
responsibility for students' care. 9 Prison officials, mental health care
94. SeeD.R.,9721F.2dat 1371.
95. See id.
96. See id. See also J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. II, 909 F.2d 267,
272-73 (7th Cir. 1990). In JO., the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit explained that its refusal to apply the doctrine to school districts derived from
the disparity in the degree of freedom allowed mental patients and prisoners as opposed
to that allowed students. See id. The court pointed out that students retain a much
greater degree of freedom than do mental patients and prisoners:
The state's custody over [a student's] person is the most distinguishing
characteristic in the cases of the mental patient and the prisoner; these people
are unable to provide for basic human needs like food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety. At most, the state might require a child
to attend school, but it cannot be suggested that compulsory school
attendance makes a child unable to care for basic human needs. The parents
still retain primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, sheltering, and caring
for the child. By mandating school attendance for children under the age of
sixteen, the state... has not assumed responsibility for their entire personal
lives; these children and their parents retain a substantial freedom to act.
Id. at 272 (internal citations omitted). The court added that, although the "analogy of
a school yard to a prison may be a popular one for school-age children,.., we cannot
recognize constitutional duties on a child's lament." Id.
97. See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1371. The court explained why custody was not
involuntary:
[lit is the parents who decide whether that education will take place in the
home, in public or private schools .... For some, the options may be limited
for financial reasons. However, even when enrolled in public school parents
retain the discretion to remove the child from classes as they see fit, ...
subject only to truancy penalties for continued periods ofunexcused absence.
In the case of special education students, the parents have even greater
involvement since they must approve the precise educational program
developed for their child. Moreover, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
recognized, even without reference to the Pennsylvania School Code or
related statutes, "it [cannot] be denied that a parent is justified in
withdrawing his child from a school where the health and welfare of the
child is threatened."
Id. (citations omitted.)
98. SeeJO., 909 F.2d at 272-73.
UALR LAW REVIEW
professionals, and foster care authorities, on the other hand, take
complete responsibility for providing the "basic needs" of the individu-
als in their custody. 99
In Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District," the court found that
students do not fit within the special relationship exception because
students are not sufficiently analogous to prisoners or involuntarily
committed mental patients.'0 ' In that case, Louis C., a ward of the State
of Arkansas, raped Brian, a mentally retarded child." 2 Despite the fact
that the state agency that placed Louis C. in the program with Brian
knew of Louis C.'s propensity toward violence, the court declined to
find a special relationship entitling Brian to the State's protection.0 3
In D.K v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School,"' ° seven
male students 5 allegedly subjected the plaintiffs to sexual assaults at
least twice a week over a five-month period.'0 6 Plaintiffs D.R. and L.H.,
both public high school students, 0 7 argued that they stood in a special
relationship with the school district."'0 The district court found that the
school district owed its students a constitutional duty of protection, and
that the duty arose from compulsory attendance and truancy laws.' °9
That court nevertheless dismissed the case because the plaintiffs had
99. See id.
100. 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
101. See id. at 1411-14. Explaining its reasoning, the court quoted Htarpole v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 820 F.2d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 1987):
The facts in the present case do not support the finding of a special
relationship because the massive state control found in the prison
environment is absent here. Without that control there is no constitutionally
mandated duty to protect one private citizen from another. We do not
believe that the concept of special relationships was intended to extend
beyond prison or prison-like environments.
Dorothy ., 794 F. Supp. at 1416.
102. See Dorothy J., 794 F. Supp. at 1407.
103. See id. at 1411-14.
104. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
105. See id. at 1366. Although the plaintiffs named all seven students as defendants
in this action, only two of the boys appeared in court. See id.
106. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that the boys repeatedly forced the girls into
either a darkroom or a bathroom. See id. Once there, the boys sodomized the girls,
offensively touched their breasts and genitals, forced the girls to perform fellatio on
them, verbally abused the girls, and forced the girls to watch them force other students
to engage in similar conduct. See id.
107. See id. at 1365. D.R. was hearing impaired and suffered resultant
communication problems. See id. at 1366 n.5. She attended the graphics art class at
Middle Bucks because, under Pennsylvania law, she qualified as an "exceptional"
student. See id.
108. See id. at 1368.
109. See id at 1367.
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failed to establish that school officials were sufficiently aware of the
misconduct to constitute reckless indifference." 0 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that custody during
part of the day did not give rise to a duty of protection."' The court
therefore affirmed the dismissal." 2
Some courts have accepted the argument that state compulsory
attendance laws create a special custodial relationship between school
districts and students." 3 For example, in Carabba v. Anacortes School
District #103," 4 the Supreme Court of Washington posited the view that
the state assumes a duty of protection under the in loco parentis
doctrine."' Because state law requires students to submit to the
mandates of the school rules, the court explained, teachers supplant
parents." 6 Teachers, therefore, must bear a responsibility to protect
students in their custody.' "' in McLeod v. Grant County School District
No. 128,"' the Supreme Court of Washington again emphasized the
correlation between the parent-child relationship and the teacher-student
relationship."9 The court pointed out that the child must obey his
teachers at school just as he must obey his parents at home.' Accord-
ing to the court, teachers owe the child a reciprocal duty to protect him
from harm, as would his parents if he were at home.'2 '
Custodial relationship analysis is difficult to overcome. A plaintiff
must establish total control and a high degree of helplessness.'22 A
I 10. See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1367. The plaintiffs alleged that, in the classroom, the
students exhibited violent, non-sexual misconduct toward other students as well as
toward the student teacher, Defendant Susan Peters. See id. at 1366. Although D.R.
and L.H. did not allege having told Ms. Peters of the incidents, they argued that she
knew or should have known of the sexually assaultive behavior and that she was or
should have been present in the classroom when the conduct took place. See id. L.H.
testified that she had informed Defendant James C. Bazzel, the school's Assistant
Director, of one boy's conduct, and Bazzel failed to try to stop the sexual assaults. See
id.
11. Seeid. at1371-73.
112. See id. at 1377.
113. See, e.g., Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103,435 P.2d 936,947-48 (Wash
1967). See also McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 255 P.2d, 360, 362-63 (Wash.
1953).
114. 435 P.2d 936 (Wash. 1967).
115. See Carabba, 435 P.2d at 947-48. See also McLeod, 255 P.2d at 362-63.
116. See Carabba, 435 P.2d at 947-48.
117. See id.
118. 255 P.2d 360 (Wash. 1953).
119. See id. at 362-63.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a
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plaintiff may, however, establish constitutional liability if she can prove
that the state created or increased the danger that led to her child's
injuries. 2
2. State Creation or Exacerbation of Danger
In DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court concluded that no
special relationship entitled Joshua DeShaney to state protection from
his father. 24 In reaching its conclusion, the Court pointed out that the
agency had neither created nor increased Joshua's danger of suffering
harm at his father's hands.'25 Thus, lower courts have interpreted the
Court's opinion in DeShaneyto provide another avenue for the establish-
ment of civil rights liability. 26 According to those courts, if a state
official creates a dangerous situation or increases an individual's
vulnerability to risk, then the State might be constitutionally liable for
the ensuing harm. 2 Courts that have employed this analysis in school
Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 124-25 (1991).
123. See id. at 126.
124. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-
98(1989).
125. See id. at 201. Joshua's mother argued that the state agency knew or should
have known of the abuse that Joshua suffered at his father's hands. See id. at 193.
Therefore, she asserted, the agency stood in a special relationship with Joshua and
owed him a duty of protection. See id. After deciding that Joshua did not fall within
the Estelle-Youngberg special relationship exception, the Court explained:
While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the
free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render
him any more vulnerable to them .... [Wihen [the agency] returned him to
his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position than that in which he
would have been had it not acted at all ... 
Id. at 201.
126. See Blum, supra note 90, at 436-37. See also Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub.
Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1998); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236
(I 0th Cir. 1996); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567,572 (1 0th Cir. 1995); Reed v. Gardner,
986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993); Dwares v. City ofNew York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d
Cir. 1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364.
1372-74 (3d Cir. 1992); Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 551 (7th
Cir. 1991); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 859 (7th Cir. 1990); Freeman v. Ferguson,
911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1521 n. 19
(7th Cir. 1990); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1392 (10th Cir. 1990);
Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 359 (11 th Cir. 1989): Hunter v.
Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 714, 720-21 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Was v. Young.
796 F. Supp. 1041, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1992); G-69 v. Degnan, 745 F. Supp. 254, 265
(D.N.J. 1990); Swader v. Virginia, 743 F. Supp. 434,439-41 (E.D. Va. 1990).
127. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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district cases, however, have invariably concluded that no state action
created or increased the risk. 2 8
In D.R., the plaintiffs' custodial relationship argument failed. 29 The
court next addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the school district
created or exacerbated the dangerous situation that led to the abuse. 3
According to the plaintiffs, the school district created or increased the
plaintiffs' peril when the school district placed an inexperienced teacher
in charge of the class; failed to notify parents of students' in-class
misconduct; failed to discipline students for in-class misconduct; failed
to investigate and stop the students' out-of-class violence; and designed
the classroom in such a way as to render students more vulnerable to
abuse. 3' The court first explained that a plaintiff could establish
liability under this theory only by showing that the state had affirma-
tively acted to increase or create the danger.'32 The plaintiffs, therefore,
could not base their argument on the school's failure to notify parents
of students' misconduct or to discipline students, because such conduct
was not affirmative action. '33 The court concluded that the design of the
classroom befit the purpose of the art class and the layout was not
inherently dangerous."3 Therefore, the court held that the school
officials' conduct did not create or exacerbate plaintiffs' vulnerability
to the sexual assaults. 35
Armijo v. Wagon Mound13 and Hunter v. Carbondale Area School
District 37 both addressed injuries that students sustained while not
physically in the custody of the school. 38 In Armijo, sixteen-year-old
Philadelflo Armijo committed suicide in his home after school officials
128. See Armiqo, 159 F.3d at 1262. See also Searmons. 84 F.3d at 1236; D.R., 972 F.2d
at 1372-74; Hunter, 829 F.Supp. at 720-21.
129. See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1373.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1373, 1375. The plaintiffs suffered most of their abuse in the
darkroom and the unisex bathroom, both of which rooms annexed the main classroom.
See id. at 1366.
132. See id. at 1374.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1375.
135. See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1375-76. In holding that the defendants' conduct did not
entitle the plaintiffs to redress under the Constitution, the court noted the "apparent
indefensible passivity of at least some school defendants under the circumstances." Id.
at 1376. The court also took care to point out that the Constitution did not necessarily
"embrace such conduct." Id.
136. 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
137. 829 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Pa. 1993).
138. See Armyo, 159 F.3d at 1257; Hunter, 829 F. Supp. at 716-17.
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suspended him and drove him home.'39 Philadelflo's parents sued the
school, seeking compensation for deprivation of their son's civil
rights. 4" The court first concluded that no custodial relationship
imposed a duty on the school district. 4 ' The court next addressed the
plaintiffs' argument that liability attached because the officials created
or worsened Philadelfio's peril.'42 Philadelflo's parents argued that the
school officials affirmatively placed their son in danger when they
suspended him and drove him home without notifying the plaintiffs. 43
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew that Philadelfio was
particularly vulnerable to committing suicide; he had expressed suicidal
tendencies, he was frequently depressed, and school officials knew that
he had access to firearms.
44
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient
to state a cause of action. 45 In reaching that conclusion, the court
carefully analyzed the plaintiffs' allegations under a five-part test which
the court then modified pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's
holding in DeShaney.46 In essence, the test requires that the plaintiff
prove that (1) she belonged to "a limited and specifically definable
group"; (2) the alleged misconduct placed her "at substantial risk of
serious, immediate and proximate harm"; (3) the defendants knew of the
risk or the risk was obvious; (4) the defendants "acted recklessly in
conscious disregard of that risk"; and (5) as a whole, the defendants'
conduct shocks the conscience.'47 The court then added that, under
DeShaney, a plaintiff must also prove that the state entity created or
worsened the dangerous condition that led to the plaintiff's injury. 18
The court concluded that Philadelfio's parents had alleged facts
sufficient to prove each element, including the DeShaney requirement. ' 9
139. See Armijo, 159 F.3dat 1256-57.
140. See id. at 1257.
141. See id. at 1261-62.
142. See id. at 1262.
143. See id. at 1258.
144. See id. at 1256-57.
145. See Armjo, 159 F.3d at 1264.
146. See id. at 1262-64.
147. Id. at 1262-63.
148. See id. at 1263.
149. See id. at 1264. The court held that the plaintiffs could proceed against
everyone but Defendant Pam Clouthier, a school aide, because the court found no facts
that indicated that Clouthier had added to or created Philadelfio's peril. See id.
Clouthier apparently took no part in the decision that led to Armijo's suspension. See
id.
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The Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached the opposite result in
Hunter.50 There, school officials ordered twelve-year-old David
Hadden, a seventh-grade special education student,' 5' to report to
detention hall after David became involved in a confrontation with other
students.' When David appeared for detention, he and the other
students engaged in another altercation.'53 After officials released the
students from detention, the other boys chased David down the hall and
through the doors of the school.'54 The chase continued off school
premises and ended when David fell into a stream, where he was found
dead four months later.' The court narrowed the dangerous situation
to the possibility that students would chase and attack David after
detention."" The court then found that the school officials took no
affirmative action to create or increase that risk.1
5 7
Plaintiffs seeking to recover for their children's student-inflicted
injuries and deaths usually fail under a constitutional tort theory.58
Neither the special relationship doctrine nor the state creation of danger
theory affords plaintiffs much hope of success." A duty under
custodial relationship analysis is also difficult to establish."W To prove
that a state entity owed a duty of protection by virtue of a special
relationship, a plaintiff must prove total, involuntary custody. 6' Thus,
150. See Hunter, 829 F. Supp. at 72 1.
151. See id. at 716.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 716-17.
156. See Hunter, 829 F. Supp. at 721.
157. See id. The court explained:
[T]here is nothing in the record . . . that suggests that either Defendant
encouraged, facilitated or authorized the students to engage in the conduct
which took place. There is no evidence at all that the Decedent would be
attacked and pursued after the detention period ended by the otherjuveniles.
The only notice that the school had of any danger to the Decedent was the
incident which occurred the day before which led to the Decedent being
detained after school ....
Id. at 721.
158. See Tennyson, supra note 7, at 1064. See also Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch.
Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992); B.M.H. v. School Bd., 833 F.
Supp. 560, 565 (E.D. Va. 1993); Hunter, 829 F. Supp. at 720; Elliott v. New Miami Bd.
of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818,823 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist.,
784 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56,61 (D.P.R.
1990); Greenfield, supra note 7, at 594-95; Shansab, supra note 7, at 777.
159. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
160. See Blum, supra note 90, at 436-37.
161. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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when the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Rudds could not hold
the Pulaski County Special School District liable for James Routt's
death, Arkansas joined the majority of courts, who have found no
constitutional liability for student-inflicted injuries.'62
IV. REASONING
In Rudd v. Pulaski County Special School District,6" the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a school district owes no duty to protect
students from harm by other students.' Parents, therefore, cannot hold
school districts liable for student aggression under the Arkansas Civil
Rights Act.65 The court examined both the School District's relationship
with the aggressor child, Willis, and the School District's relationship
with the harmed student, James, and the court found that no special
relationship existed between the School District and either James or
Willis." According to the court, no state action caused the incident;
therefore, the school could not be held liable for James's death. 67
A. State Actor Analysis: No Right to Restrain Aggressor
Finding no custodial relationship between the School District and
Willis, the court held that Willis was not a state actor within the
meaning of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. 68 The court posed the issue
concerning Willis's status as a twofold inquiry. First, the court had to
determine whether a custodial relationship between the School District
and Willis imposed upon the School District a duty to restrain Willis
from harming another student. 69 Second, provided that the court were
to find such a duty, the court had to decide whether the School District's
162. See Tennyson, supra note 7, at 1064. See also Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch.
Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992); B.M.H. v. School Bd., 833 F.
Supp. 560, 565 (E.D. Va. 1993); Hunter, 829 F. Supp. at 720; Elliott v. New Miami Bd.
of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 823 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist.,
784 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1992); Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56,61 (D.P.R.
1990); Greenfield, supra note 7, at 594-95; Shansab, supra note 7, at 777.
163. 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000).
164. See id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 314.
165. See id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 315.
166. See id. at 798-801, 20 S.W.3d at 312-16.
167. See id. at 799-800, 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
168. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
169. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 798, 20 S.W.3d at 312.
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nonfeasance "transform[ed] [Willis] into a state actor."'170 In other
words, if a custodial relationship exists between the state entity and the
aggressor, the court explained, then the state entity thereby owes a duty
to restrain the aggressor child from acting out violently toward other
students.'71
Although ultimately distinguishing these cases, the court first
looked to case law involving custodial relationships between persons
and state entities other than school districts. 7 1 While acknowledging
that several courts, including the Arkansas Supreme Court, 17 have found
a custodial relationship to exist between prisons and their prisoners,'74
the court declined to extend the holdings in those cases to school
districts and their students.7 5 The court explained that prison liability
derives from prison officials' right to restrain prisoners' actions, and,
unlike prisons, school districts and their employees have no right to
restrain students' actions. 76 Also, the court advised, imposing upon
school district employees a duty to restrain violent children would
interfere with employees' "primary purpose of teaching and carrying out
administrative duties."'
77
The court, then, found no custodial relationship between the School
District and Willis. Willis, therefore, was not a state actor for purposes
of civil rights liability. 178 Accordingly, the School District could owe no
duty unless its relationship with James imposed on it an affirmative duty
of protection. 
79
B. Custodial Relationship Analysis: No Duty to Protect Victim
After finding no special relationship between the School District
and Willis, the court turned to the question of whether a special
custodial relationship existed between the School District and James.80
170. Id., 20 S.W.3d at 312.
171. See id. at 799-800, 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
172. See id. at 798-800, 20 S.W.3d at 312-13.
173. See Shepherd v. Washington County, 331 Ark. 480, 962 S.W.2d 779 (1998).
174. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 799, 20 S.W.3d at 313.
175. See id. at 799, 20 S.W.3d at 313.
176. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 313. The court presumably means that school officials
cannot restrain students in the same way that prison officials and mental health care
professionals may restrain individuals in their custody. For further discussion, see infra
note 202.
177. Rudd, 341 Ark. at 799, 20 S.W.3d at 313.
178. See id. at 799-800, 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
179. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
180. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 800, 20 S.W.3d at 314.
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The existence of such a relationship would impose upon the district a
duty to protect James and could thus render the School District liable for
Willis's violence.' 8' The court, relying solely on DorothyJ. v. Little Rock
School District,82 found no special custodial relationship between the
School District and James.
83
The Arkansas Supreme Court espoused the Dorothy J. court's
rejection of the argument that compulsory school attendance laws placed
the school district-student relationship in the category of special
custodial relationships.' The court further adopted the district court's
finding that school district liability for student-inflicted harm would
force teachers to take on the roles of prison guards or police officers.'85
Another important factor in the Dorothy J. decision involved the
remoteness of the violence from the state action; the violence in Dorothy
J. took place at least two years after the state action.'8 6 The court in
Rudd did not expressly address the remoteness of Willis's action from
the State's alleged misfeasance.'87 The Rudd court did, however, note
that, during his attendance at Jacksonville High, Willis had apparently
not repeated the misbehavior which had characterized his attendance at
Sylvan Hills.88
In sum, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that no custodial
relationship existed between the School District and Willis that would
impose upon the School District a duty to restrain Willis. 89 Likewise,
no special custodial relationship existed between the School District and
James that would impose upon the School District a duty to protect
James."9 Therefore, in the court's view, no state action led to James's
murder.'9 ' Thus the appellants could not hold the School District liable
for Willis's actions because the appellants failed to prove state action as
the cause of James's death.' 92
181. Seeid.,20S.W.3dat314.
182. 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), affd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
183. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 800-01, 20 S.W.3d at 314.
184. See id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 314 (citing Dorothy J., 794 F. Supp. at 1414).
185. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 314 (citing Dorothy J., 794 F. Supp. at 1414). The district
court in Dorothy J. also remarked that liability would result "anytime a child skinned
his knee on the playground or was beat-up by the school bully." Dorothy 1, 794 F.
Supp. at 1414.
186. See Dorothy J., 794 F. Supp. at 1421, 1424.
187. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 801,20 S.W.3d at 315.
188. See id., 20 S.W.3d at 315.
189. See id. at 799-800, 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
190. See id. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 315.
191. See id. at 799-800, 20 S.W.3d at 313-14.
192. See id.
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V. SIGNIFICANCE
In holding that school districts owe children no duty of protection
from peer abuse, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Ruddv. Pulaski County
Special School District,93 joined the majority of jurisdictions. The
majority of courts, however, have based their conclusions on faulty
logic. The analysis that underlies the majority trend is flawed because
the holdings in those cases do not logically follow from the Supreme
Court's holdings in Estelle, Youngberg, and DeShaney. And although the
Arkansas Supreme Court reached the correct result in this case, the
court's ruling in Rudd unnecessarily sounds the death knell for every
parent in Arkansas whose child suffers injury or death at the hands of
fellow classmates.
In every decision where a court has found no constitutional duty to
protect school children, courts have attempted to apply and interpret the
United States Supreme Court's opinions in Estelle, Youngberg, and
DeShaney.94 in attempting to apply those holdings to school district
cases, courts have interpreted the dependency requirement too narrowly.
Courts have declined to include school children within the special
relationship doctrine on the basis that school districts' custody of
children is not absolutely involuntary.' The problem with this
reasoning is that the Supreme Court's establishment of the special
relationship doctrine is not based on absolute involuntariness.'
96
In Estelle, where the Supreme Court first recognized a duty arising
from a custodial relationship, the Court focused on the State's impair-
ment of an individual's ability to care for himself and the individual's
resultant dependency on the State.'97 Unlike an incarcerated adult, who
would supply his own basic needs but for the State's deprivation of his
liberty, children always depend on adults for their care. Without state
compulsory attendance laws, children would not be any more capable
of feeding, clothing, and sheltering themselves than they are when laws
193. 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000).
194. Author's note: Although the Rudd court did not mention DeShaney in its
opinion, the court's reference to cases applying special relationship analysis and the
state creation of danger doctrine reflects that it considered DeShaney and its progeny.
See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 798-801, 20 S.W.3d at 312-15.
195. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1371 (3d Cir. 1992). See also J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d
267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990).
196. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309; DeShaney, 489 U.S.
at 198-203.
197. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
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force them to attend school. Hence, because children are always at the
mercy of the adults whom they accompany, the analysis of whether a
duty of care exists should not turn on the involuntariness of the child's
presence in the company of those adults.
In Youngberg, Nicholas Romeo's mother petitioned the court to
commit Nicholas to a mental care institution."" Because every state
mandates that parents send their children to school, parents have less
freedom in "choosing" to send their children to public schools than Ms.
Romeo had in petitioning the court to commit her son to a mental health
care hospital.'" Yet the Supreme Court in Youngberg found that
Pennhurst State Hospital owed Nicholas a duty, not only to provide him
with the "basic needs" of food and shelter, but also to provide him with
"habilitation," or "minimally adequate training." ° Moreover, the plight
of school children is similar to Nicholas Romeo's situation in that
children have no choice whatsoever in which schools they attend.
Parents choose where their children attend school, as Ms. Romeo chose
where her son would receive treatment for his disability.
Finally, the lower courts' blanket refusal to find a duty of protection
in school district cases does not rationally follow from the Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney. In DeShaney, Joshua had been in the state
agency's custody only once.2"' But a state agency's removal of a child
from his home on one occasion is not analogous to a state's compulsion
of its children's attendance at the same place every day from early
childhood into near adulthood.
Therefore, the majority's reliance on the principle of absolutely
involuntary custody is flawed because that analysis does not logically
follow from the Supreme Court's development of the special relation-
ship analysis.
The main problem with the Rudd decision is that it foreclosed any
possibility that any school district or school official could ever be liable
for failing to protect students from other students.0 2 The court's holding
means that no matter how egregious a school official's decision not to
198. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
199. See Greenfield, supra note 7, at 588 n.1, 624.
200. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 318-19, 322.
201. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
202. Author's note: Another problem with the Rudd decision is that the court bases
its holding in part on the inaccurate premise that school districts possess no right to
restrain students. See Rudd, 20 S.W.3d at 313. Students are subject to various types of
restraint by school officials: they may be suspended, expelled, and detained. In some
districts, school officials may even administer corporal punishment to students who
misbehave. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-501 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
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act, no child in Arkansas can ever recover for harm he suffers at the
hands of fellow students. Such an absolute denial neither serves the
policy reasons underlying the decision nor follows logically from the
Supreme Court's interpretations of custodial relationship analysis. After
this decision, if a child were to approach a teacher, show the teacher a
gun and announce his intention of killing a classmate, the teacher could
not be liable for doing absolutely nothing. The teacher is under no legal
obligation to notify a principal, a superintendent, a police officer, the
children's parents, or even the possible victim.
Although absolute foreclosure was unnecessary, the court's
decision in James Routt's case wasjustified. From a legal standpoint,
even if compulsory attendance laws place children in a special
relationship with school districts, James was twenty years old when
Willis shot him. 3 State law no longer required that James attend
school.2° Further, if the analysis turns on the degree of the victim's
dependency, and children are always dependent, James's case still fails
because he was not a child.
Policy reasons also support the court's decision in Rudd. During his
attendance at Jacksonville High, Willis had not repeated the behavior
that characterized his attendance at Sylvan Hills." 5 In Rudd, the
possibility that Willis might act out violently probably seemed at the
time only slightly greater than any other child's tendency toward
violence. School officials who attempt to prevent violence in situations
like that which precipitated Ruddsubject themselves to liability from the
targeted child's parents. Parents of injured children and parents of
children that the school district deems violent will both sue school
districts. Whether school officials act or not, they will be subject to
liability.
Moreover, the school district had taken every possible precaution
with the possible exception of informing Ms. Davis of Willis's violent
history. Sylvan Hills authorities had expelled Willis when he demon-
strated violent tendencies the year before and had recorded each incident
in their records. 2" It would be neither practical nor fair to expect a
school to track each student's history from the beginning of the child's
attendance and to report that history to every school official who might
come into contact with that child and to further require that officials
prevent children from misbehaving when those children demonstrate no
203. See Crownover, supra note I, at I A.
204. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201 (LEXIS Repl. 1999).
205. See Rudd, 341 Ark. at 801, 20 S.W.3d at 314-15.
206. See id. at 796, 20 S.W.3d at 311.
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intention of doing so. As the Court in Estelle explained, state entities
should not be liable for failing to protect against an "unforeseeable
accident."2 7
On the other hand, not every fact situation should lead to this result.
Where children make known their violent tendencies or where teachers
actually know of specific misconduct, courts should allow liability to
attach to school districts who fail to act. Rather than summarily
disposing of school district cases, courts should carefully consider the
specific facts of each case before declaring that school districts owe no
duty of protection.
In conclusion, the majority trend away from finding a duty to
protect in public schools derives from a questionable analysis. Further,
after Rudd, Arkansas plaintiffs have no chance of recovering against a
school district for an official's failure to act, regardless of the circum-
stances in which a student's violence arises. Despite the court's
unnecessary foreclosure of school district liability in every situation,
however, both policy and law justified the Arkansas Supreme Court's
decision to follow the majority trend in Rudd.
Kimberly Miller"
207. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (citing Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
(1947)).
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